small piece of official French War Office notepaper dated March 9th, 1831, and
signed by the then reigning monarch of France, Louis-Philippe. He had been on
the throne for barely eight months when he authorized this measure, which was
as much a product of necessity as of careful planning, although there may be
divided views on this.
The reasons for forming the French Foreign Legion were probably twofold.
In the first place the men of the disbanded royal bodyguard and the Regiment of
Hohenlohe, suddenly turned loose on to the street of a capital seething with un-
rest, unemployed and perhaps disgruntled at their abrupt dismissal, were a po-
tentially dangerous element. They were trained to the use of arms, and should
they become tools of the politically ambitious or discontented they would present
a distinct menace to the new regime, not yet too firmly established and sure of
itself.
For some time Paris had been swarming with countless other discharged
foreign soldiers who had served in the French army at various times under the
Empire and the Republic, many of whom were in needy circumstances and open
to suggestion, whilst others were openly looking for trouble and always ready to
take part in any disturbance. It was clearly both expedient and desirable to re-
move these dangers as far away from the capital as possible.
Next, the Algerian adventure had begun, and it appeared that this might prove
expensive in lives. The more Frenchmen killed in North Africa, the less popular
the government at home would be, so if foreign cannon fodder was available so
much the better. The Algerian landing had been viewed with mixed feelings in
a politically divided France, but there does not seem to have been, any marked
indication on the part of the politicians that they were unanimous that the occu-
pation should be abruptly terminated; most were wary and many apprehensive
as to how the Algerian business would turn out.
The formation of a foreign legion seemed therefore to be an ideal method of
killing these two birds with one stone. Once the conditions were made clear there
does not seem o have been any serious opposition.
Marshal Soult was reputed to be the man behind the scheme both for remov-
ing and using the unemployed foreign ex-soldiers. He could not have failed to
recognize, once they were formed into disciplined units, how useful they would
be, both for garrison duty and for active operations in Algeria, nor the fact that
if their casualties were heavy or their conditions not of the best, there would be
no embarrassing reaction for agitation in France on their behalf.
The Royal Ordinance decreed that there should be a legion formed
foreigners for service outside France, which was to be called the 'Foreign
Legion' and it was to be part of the French army and under the control of the
War Minister. It laid down that as far as possible companies should be composed
of men of the same nationality or who spoke a common language. Algeria was not
specifically mentioned but as it was the only scrap of foreign territory of any size
possessed by France at that moment, there was no doubt as to the meaning of
the phrase 'outside France'.
In the anxiety to get dubious, restless characters out of the country no ques-
tions were asked as to nationality, previous record or history, and no proof of
identity was required. The name and particulars given by the recruit were
accepted at face value and many gave noms de guerre,* for understandable rea-
sons. Thus the practice began, and the tradition started of 'asking no questions'.
This tradition of guaranteeing anonymity began to develop quickly, although it
was not until later that it was carried to the extreme of denying all knowledge of
any individuals who were in its ranks and of refusing point blank to answer
questions or to allow any outside contact with the legionnaires.
* Pseudonyms.
